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T

echn
nology has always
a
been
n a motivatin
ng force of change in tthe
law. The creatio
on of new machines and
a developm
ment of novvel
methods of achievin
ng goals fo
orce the law
w to adapt w
with new aand
responsiv
ve rules. Thiis is particullarly true wh
henever a neew technoloogy
transform
ms society. Whether it
i is increaasing indusstrialization or
computerrization, prre-existing legal conccepts rarelyy survive tthe
transition
n unaltered—
—new prescrriptions are announced w
while old onnes
disappearr.
Consider, for ex
xample, how
w products liability
l
has evolved ovver
time. In the nineteeenth century
y, unless th
he product w
was inherenntly
dangerou
us, direct privity was neeeded between the injuredd party and tthe
manufactturer in ordeer to recoverr in tort. Thiis rule was uunderstandabble
during th
he period before the 190
00s for two primary
p
reassons. First, tthe
technolog
gy of the 18
800s and earlier was com
mprehensiblee by most. T
The
average person who
o acquired a product was
w likely to be able to
understan
nd the baasic princip
ples by which
w
it ooperated annd,
consequeently, could evaluate th
he safety off the producct. Second, tthe
manufactturer was lik
kely to be within
w
the same generall locale as tthe
final con
nsumer. As neighbors,
n
th
he purchaser was likely tto have know
wn
the reputtation of thee manufactu
urer and the quality of tthe productss it
produced
d and could avoid acqu
uiring a prod
duct from a manufactuurer
who was not trusted.
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After the turn of the century, improvements in transportation and
the mobility of goods in the marketplace made this less common. In
the MacPherson case, for example, the plaintiff was injured when a
wheel on an automobile collapsed.1 In an earlier time, it would have
been unlikely that MacPherson would have purchased a fullyfunctional vehicle from a manufacturer located half a continent away;
instead, he would have acquired it from the local wagon-maker and
wheelwright. MacPherson would have known the abilities of his
neighbors, and could have inspected the cart and wheel as they were
made to discover any defects. By the beginning of the twentieth
century, however, the customer in New York was buying a completed
product from a retail distributor who had acquired it from the
manufacturer in Michigan who had, in turn, acquired the wheel from
another manufacturer in some unknown location.2
The new technologies of interchangeable parts and mechanized
assembly lines allowed this to occur.3 As the courts recognized in
MacPherson and similar cases, the industrial age required new rules.
The old legal rule that focused on the product’s inherent
dangerousness no longer served the purpose of promoting safety.4
With remote customers acquiring technologically sophisticated
products, a new rule was needed.5
A more comprehensive example of law changing in response to
new technology can be found by examining the technology of
publishing and the legal response in the form of copyright law, from
their foundations in the fifteenth century to today. Before Gutenberg
invented the movable type press in 1436,6 there was no need for
copyright law. During that time, a scribe would require hundreds to

1

Id.
See id.
3
See generally Sally H. Clarke, Unmanageable Risks: MacPherson v. Buick and
the Emergence of a Mass Consumer Market, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 14–15 (2005)
(examining incidents of defects and the need for public and private inspection after
automobile mass production was made possible by the assembly line and
interchangeable parts).
4
See David G. Owen, The Evolution of Products Liability Law, 26 REV. LITIG.
955, 966-69 (2007). But Cf. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (N.Y.
1931) (“The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace.”).
5
See Owen, supra note 4, at 969.
6
Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and Its Key Role in the
Future, 3 J.L. & TECH 1, 3 (1988).
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thousands of hours to hand copy another’s work.7 The inaccuracy and
high cost of the process made it prohibitive for most.8 The movable
type press mitigated both of these problems. Although it would take
several hours to set each page of a book in type, thousands of copies of
the page could be produced rapidly thereafter.9 Further, as the type
was set, errors could be identified and eliminated.10 Consequently, the
overall time it took to accurately reproduce a work dropped
dramatically.
The common law system first addressed the changes wrought by
the movable type press technology in England. Not long after the
invention of the press, the King gave the Stationers Company a royal
prerogative to control the publication of books, which included the
ability to prohibit piracy.11 Eventually, the Licensing of the Press Act
of 1662 granted the Company complete control over what was printed
in England.12 Not surprisingly, this private control of printing led to
abuses stemming particularly from the perpetual protection of works.13
Parliament responded in 1710 with the Statute of Anne, which
established a system of protecting printed works that we can recognize
as copyright protection.14

7

LEILA AVRIN, SCRIBES, SCRIPT AND BOOKS 128 (2010) (“A scribe could write
between six and sixteen pages a day, and perhaps wrote for six and seven hours a day
in a five- or six-day workweek, excluding holidays.”).
8
See ELIZABETH L. EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING PRESS AS AN AGENT OF CHANGE
46–47 (1979) (Noting, in a discussion of scrivener accuracy versus print accuracy,
that “. . .it is doubtful whether one should refer to ‘identical copies’ being
‘multiplied’ before print.”); see also id. at 72 (On cost, the author notes that, after the
press, students and scholars could undertake much broader studies because
“. . .printing made books cheap and plentiful.”).
9
See generally FRAN REES, JOHANNES GUTENBERG: INVENTOR OF THE PRINTING
PRESS 50–56 (2006) (explaining movable type setting process).
10
SABRINA ALCORN BARON ET AL., AGENT OF CHANGE: PRINT CULTURE
STUDIES AFTER ELIZABETH L. EISENSTEIN 144 (2007).
11
Isabella Alexander, All Change for the Digital Economy: Copyright and
Business Models in the Early Eighteenth Century, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1351,
1356–57 (2010) (describing the Licensing Act of 1662). To be fair, it seems clear
that the primary goal of the Stationers Company was to censure works that portrayed
the King or the Church in an unfavorable light more than it was to provide copyright
to authors and publishers. See id. at 1356.
12
Id. at 1356–57.
13
See id. at 1357.
14
Id. at 1359 (Most importantly, the Statute of Anne limited the duration of the
protections received by an author or publisher.).
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In the United States, the Statute of Anne was in force as part of
each state’s common law as the U.S. established its independence from
England.15 In the first Congress, the Copyright Act of 1790 was passed
providing limited nation-wide copyright protection.16 Similar to the
rights afforded by the Statute of Anne,17 the new Copyright Act gave
authors the right to publish and vend books, maps, and charts, and, by
its very terms, was limited to preventing verbatim copying of the
work.18 Throughout this time—from the Stationers Company through
the adoption of the 1790 Act—publishing technology was stable,
subject only to incremental improvement, so no fundamental legal
changes were required.19
In 1798, however, the invention of the lithographic press radically
altered publishing technology and continued the trend of decreasing
printing costs.20 Furthermore, as chromolithography became
commonplace in the mid to late 1800s, multi-color printing became
practical.21 With technologically feasible and affordable multi-color
printing, such things as posters and pictures could be reproduced with
the speed that had previously only applied to text.22 In response to this
technological advancement, Congress amended the Copyright Act in
1831 to begin covering some of these works.23 However, it was not
until the 1870 Act that color lithographs became fully protected by
copyright law.24

15

Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism in Copyright
Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 549, 585–86 (2010) (describing proliferation of the Statute of
Anne into Colonial American state laws).
16
Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831).
17
See Van Houweling, supra note 15, at 585–86.
18
See supra note 16, § 1 (“the author . . . of any map, chart, book . . . shall have
the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending such map,
chart, or book for the like term of fourteen years . . .”).
19
ROBERT WEDGEWORTH, WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIBRARY AND
INFORMATION SERVICES 228–229 (1993).
20
ELIZABETH R. PENNELL & JOSEPH PENNELL, LITHOGRAPHY AND
LITHOGRAPHERS: SOME CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF THE ART 5, 238 (1915).
21
DAVID PANKOW, TEMPTING THE PALETTE: A SURVEY OF COLOR PRINTING
PROCESSES 32 (2005).
22
See id.
23
See Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1, 7, 4 Stat. 436, 436, 438 (repealed
1870) (The Act also provided for copyright protection for musical compositions for
the first time.).
24
Copyright Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (repealed 1909).
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In the last century, the speed of technological innovation increased
significantly. Six major newly developed technologies stressed the
bounds of copyright law: recorded music, movies, radio, television,
photocopiers, and computers.25 Congress’ first response to these new
technologies was to repeatedly amend the Copyright Act until finally,
in the mid-1970s, a completely new approach was used.
The first major technology faced by Congress was the mechanical
reproduction of sound.26 Although musical compositions had been
eligible for copyright protection since the Copyright Act of 1831,
when the Supreme Court was called upon to examine the player-piano
roll, it determined that it did not represent the same thing as the
copyrighted song and, thus, the roll did not infringe the copyright in
the musical composition.27 This problem, among others, led to a major
revision of copyright law: the Copyright Act of 1909.28 The 1909 Act
greatly broadened the types of works that could be copyrighted.29
Soon after the 1909 Act was adopted, however, more new
technologies were invented and entered into the marketplace; this led
to a series of amendments throughout the 1900s. For example,
amendments passed in 1912 addressed radio broadcasts30 of musical
compositions31 and motion pictures.32 As copyright amendments

25

See, e.g., Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Legal Realism in Action: Indirect
Copyright Liability’s Continuing Tort Framework and Sony’s De Facto Demise, 55
UCLA L. REV. 143 passim 2007 (discussing the application of the result reached in
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). The court
held that there was no secondary copyright infringement liability for producing
Betamax video recorder to other technologies which can be used for duplication.).
26
As the phonograph was invented in 1877, it represents the earliest of the
technologies to be addressed. See Mary Bellis, The Inventions of Thomas Edison,
ABOUT.COM, http://inventors.about.com/library/inventors/bledison.htm (last visited
Apr. 28, 2012).
27
See White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
28
See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 5, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed in 1976).
29
Id. § 5, 35 Stat. at 1076–77.
30
Radio was invented in 1895 and moved into commercial exploitation by the
early 1900s. See Mary Bellis, The Invention of Radio, ABOUT.COM, http: //inventors
.about.com/od/rstartinventions/a/radio.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2012).
31
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distrib. Corp. v. Bijou Theatre Co., 59 F.2d 70, 76
(1st Cir. 1932) (“It is now held that broadcasting musical productions for profit over
a radio may constitute an infringement.”). Although the copyright in the musical
composition was recognized in 1912, it was not until 1971 that the performance of
music became copyrightable for the first time. See Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No.
92-140, § 1(c), 85 Stat. 391 (Lexis) (codified as amended 17 U.S.C. § 402).
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continued to be needed, particularly caused by the increasing pace of
technological change, Congress ultimately replaced the 1909 Act in
1976.33 Within the new act—in addition to updating the law to better
address existing technologies34—the act addressed new technologies
such as the photocopier,35 television,36 cable,37 and computers.38
One of the expressed purposes of the 1976 Copyright Act was to
prevent each new technical invention from requiring copyright law to
be completely reworked.39 Thus far, the new approach seems to have
worked. However, the impact of the Internet and World Wide Web on
the effectiveness of the Copyright Act is still being measured. On the
32

Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, 37 Stat. 488 (Lexis) (amending § 5 of the
Copyright Act of 1909 to include “(m)— Motion pictures other than photoplays:”).
Motion Pictures were invented in 1888. See Mary Bellis, The Inventions of Thomas
Edison, ABOUT.COM, http://inventors.about.com/library/inventors/bledison.htm (last
visited Apr. 5, 2012).
33
See Copyright Act of 1976, Public Law No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at
17 U.S.C. § § 101 et seq.).
34
See 17 U.S.C. § § 115–16 (2006) (establishing compulsory licenses in musical
works and establishing common royalties for coin-operated record players).
35
Cf. id. § 108 (authorizing libraries to reproduce works, which would, in
general, require the use of a photocopier). The photocopier was invented in 1937.
See Mary Bellis, The History of Xerox, ABOUT.COM, http://inventors.about.com/od
/xyzstartinventions/a/xerox.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2012).
36
17 U.S.C. § 112 (authorizing transmitting organization such as television
stations to record the broadcast). Television was invented in 1906, but its
commercialization did not occur until the late 1940s and early 1950s. See Mary
Bellis,
Television
History,
ABOUT.COM,
http://inventors.about.com/od
/tstartinventions/a/Television.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2012).
37
17 U.S.C. § 111 (authorizing many secondary transmissions of television
broadcasts). The first cable television systems were developed in the late 1940s to
allow people living in remote areas to receive television. See Mary Bellis, Cable
Television History, ABOUT.COM, http://inventors.about.com/library/inventors
/blcabletelevision.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2012).
38
17 U.S.C. § 117 (establishing computer user’s rights to use copyrighted
software). The first fully programmable digital computers were operational in the
mid-1940s. See Mary Bellis, The History of Computers, ABOUT.COM, http:
//inventors.about.com/library/blcoindex.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2012).
39
See H. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 6 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5664 (“Authors are continually finding new ways of expressing themselves,
but it is impossible to foresee the forms that these new expressive methods will take.
The bill does not intend either to freeze the scope of copyrightable subject matter at
the present stage of communications technology or to allow unlimited expansion into
areas completely outside the present congressional intent. Section 102 implies
neither that subject matter is unlimited nor that new forms of expression within that
general area of subject matter would necessarily be unprotected.”).
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positive side, the fundamental approach of the act—providing
copyright to works fixed in a tangible medium of expression40—has
worked for technologies invented after 1976 without requiring
significant amendments. The new technologies of the past thirty-five
years—such as the VCR, personal computer, Internet, CD, and
DVD—have not required an amendment to the basic definition of what
works are copyrightable. This is not to suggest, however, that new
technologies have not challenged the overall effectiveness of the
Copyright Act.41 Obviously, problems have occurred within the
practical functioning of the law. With the speed and ease of
duplication and distribution provided by the Internet, copyright rights
and remedies may not provide any real protection for the author,
particularly where music is involved.42
What this copyright law history shows is that adaptations of the
law in response to technology is hardly novel. The law has had to
respond multiple times, and indeed, the speed of the changes is clearly
accelerating. New technology means new law.43
The articles and notes in this issue of the University of
Massachusetts Law Review discuss this interface between technology
and the law. Each addresses its own area: controlling the work of a
crime laboratory; using GPS systems to prevent repeat domestic
violence; engaging in online, virtual arbitration; controlling electronic
discovery; and determining the effect of the First Amendment on a
student’s use of social media. Whether the interest is in these specific
topics or on the broader issue of legally addressing new discoveries,
the materials within this journal are apropos.

40

17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
See generally supra note 25.
42
See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
43
Creating new law is not the only effect. New technology will often result in
old law becoming irrelevant. When was the last time that a court was required to
define what a “bridle-way” is? See Flagg v. Flagg, 82 Mass. 175, 178 (1860)
(defining a “bridle-way” and distinguishing it from a “drift-way.”).
41

